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ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE DESERT SOUTHWEST
T his has been a disappointing year for El Paso 
in terms of job growth. Through October, the city 
added  only  1,200  new  wage  and  salary  jobs,  ac-
cording to seasonally adjusted data, an annualized 
growth rate of less than 1 percent.1 The seasonally   
adjusted unemployment rate remained at a histori-
cally low level of 5.4 percent in October, but progress 
in lowering the rate further stalled at midyear. 
El Paso’s job growth over the past decade has 
had a strong positive correlation with the U.S. busi-
ness cycle (Chart 1).2 El Paso’s industrial roots and 
continued economic ties to the Mexican maquila-
dora industry keep the city closely linked to the U.S. 
factory system. A broad slowdown in U.S. growth—
jobs grew at a 1.1 percent rate through October—
has been under way for over a year and provides the 
backdrop to sluggish local growth.
However, some elements of El Paso’s economic 
performance are specific to the city. For example, 
the major factor behind lower U.S. growth is the 
housing bust, an event whose effects vary widely in 
markets across the country, and El Paso has its own 
story to tell. Further, economic neighbor Mexico has 
broken out of the mold of mechanically following the 
U.S. business cycle, with surprisingly good growth 
continuing in that country. And the maquiladora in-
dustry has at least held its own across the border in 
Ciudad Juárez, with job growth flat in recent months. 
Finally, El Paso has high expectations built up by the 
Fort Bliss expansion. It is an economic boom that 
is still waiting to happen; the stimulus is unfolding 
more slowly than initially forecast. 
Housing Turns Down
U.S. economic growth slowed in the middle of 
2006, with the gross domestic product expanding at 
annualized rates of 2.4, 1.1, 2.1 and 0.6 percent in 
consecutive quarters. Growth bounced back in the 
second and third quarters of this year to around 4 
percent but is widely expected to slip back to near 2 
to 2.5 percent in coming quarters. Sluggish auto sales 
and a major downturn in the housing market are the 
major reasons for the diminished pace of economic 
growth. On average, over the last five quarters the 
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the third quarter of this year, only 
4 percent could do so. New York 
and Miami follow a similar pattern, 
while more developer-friendly cit-
ies like Atlanta, Houston and Dal-
las saw limited appreciation rela-
tive to income, even in the face of 
strong economic growth and surg-
ing home demand. As these local 
price bubbles burst, the resulting 
decline  in  metropolitan  hous-
ing  markets  was  uneven  across 
metro areas but big enough in ag-
gregate  to  be  a  macroeconomic 
event, with double-digit declines 
nationally  in  new  and  existing 
home sales, residential starts and 
permits. 
El Paso was part of the prob-
lem.  Local  home  prices  jumped 
43 percent between 2004 and the 
third quarter of this year. In first 
quarter 2004, over 70 percent of 
El Pasoans could afford a median-
priced home. This fell to less than 
30  percent  early  this  year  and 
to nearly 20 percent in the third 
quarter. Part of the price escala-
tion  was  local  and  out-of-town 
speculation  driven  by  the  Fort 
Bliss expansion.
The second stage of housing 
problems began in August, when 
subprime, low-documentation and 
other  high-interest-rate  lending 
was  abruptly  curtailed  as  a  re-
sult of credit problems spreading 
through  financial  markets.  This 
high-interest lending had been in-
strumental in fueling home-price 
escalation by stretching the nor-
mal lending standards and greatly 
expanding the number of poten-
tial buyers. As these financing ve-
hicles disappeared, they sharply 
narrowed the number of potential 
buyers.
Table 2 shows the percentage 
of new mortgages by metro area 
in 2006 that were originated us-
ing high-interest loans, defined as 
mortgage lending at rates 3 per-
cent or more above the yields on 
prevailing  Treasury  securities  of 
similar duration.4 Selected major 
metro areas are listed on the left; 
regional  cities  are  on  the  right. 
Texas border cities, including El 
Paso, relied heavily on high-inter-
est lending last year and now find 
a significant fraction of those po-
tential customers excluded from 
the market. 
decline in residential investment 
alone has subtracted nearly 1 per-
cent from GDP growth.  
The  housing  downturn  un-
folded in two steps. 
The  first  stage  was  a  rapid 
price appreciation in many met-
ropolitan markets, the product of 
low-interest rates that drove de-
mand, and land-use and building 
restrictions that limited the sup-
ply of new homes in many mar-
kets.  Price  appreciation  turned 
into  a  price  bubble  in  selected 
markets, mostly on the East and 
West coasts, and the bubbles be-
gan to burst in 2006 as potential 
buyers  were  increasingly  priced 
out of the market. 
For example, in late 1999, 43 
percent of families in Los Angeles 
could afford to buy and finance a 
median-priced home (Table 1).3 By 
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, with adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Table 1
Percentage of Local Families  




Los Angeles  43  4
New York  55  7
Miami  59  11
Chicago  61  40
Dallas  64  54
Houston  66  47
Atlanta  73  64
SOURCE: Wells Fargo Housing Opportunity  
  Index.
Table 2
Use of High-Cost Mortgages for Originations by Metro Area, 2006
Major	cities	 Percent	 Regional	cities	 Percent
Detroit  52.94  McAllen  54.25
Miami  50.07  Laredo  49.00
Los Angeles  34.69  Brownsville  47.37
Las Vegas  31.06  El Paso  37.18
Chicago  27.33  Phoenix  30.33
Atlanta  24.37  Tucson  20.14
New York  21.65  Las Cruces  17.44
Boston  19.88  Albuquerque  17.10
Philadelphia  16.74
San Francisco  13.32
NOTE: A high-cost mortgage is one that yields 3 percent above prevailing Treasury securities.
SOURCE: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.2  Crossroads Issue 2 • 2007  
Both new- and existing-home 
sales slowed sharply this year in 
El Paso, with the top of the mar-
ket hurt worse than the less ex-
pensive end. Existing-home sales 
were down 21 percent in October 
versus a year earlier; the number 
of houses on the market jumped 
70  percent  in  the  same  period. 
Builders have pulled back sharply 
on new construction and, in some 
cases,  are  returning  lots  to  de-
velopers. As seen in Chart 2, the 
number  of  single-family  permits 
issued in El Paso has been fall-
ing steadily all year, taking away 
an  important  source  of  recent 
growth for the city. 
Mexico and the Maquiladoras
Another source of El Paso’s 
slowing  economy  is  the  maqui-
ladora  industry.  Maquiladora 
employment  in  Ciudad  Juárez 
in 2006 grew more rapidly than 
in  any  other  Texas  border  city, 
adding over 12,000 jobs. But this 
year,  job  growth  has  come  to  a 
standstill as slower U.S. economic 
growth cast a chill over the Mexi-
can maquiladora system—includ-
ing Juárez.  
Mexico’s  maquiladoras  are 
intimately  tied  to  U.S.  indus-
trial  production.  Chart  3  shows 
how  U.S.  industrial  production 
has  driven  maquiladora  employ-
ment  since  1990,  including  the 
big  downturn  of  2000–03,  when 
the industry lost nearly a quarter 
million  jobs.  The  downturn  was 
partly  cyclical,  coinciding  with 
the 2001 recession in the U.S., but 
it was also forced by the advent of 
low-wage competition from China 
and  other  Asian,  Caribbean  and 
Central American countries.5 
This  low-wage  competition 
forced heavy job losses in apparel, 
textiles, toys and other low-wage 
industries. It took several years for 
the maquiladora industry to work 
through these losses and find firm 
footing again in products in which 
Mexico has a competitive advan-
tage. These include products that 
benefit from proximity to the U.S., 
like big-screen television sets and 
appliances; products with a high 
ratio of value-added to labor con-
tent,  like  medical  instruments; 
and products that contain intel-
lectual property to be protected. 
From 2003 to 2006, maquiladoras 
again followed the lead of a strong 
U.S.  economy  until  a  cyclical 
slowdown  gripped  the  industry 
again this year.   
Juárez’ maquiladora employ-
ment is shown in Chart 4. Mexico’s 
chief  statistical  agency  stopped 
publishing  maquiladora  employ-
ment  as  of  last  October,  but  a 
similar  data  series  is  available 
from the Mexican Social Security 
Institute.6 This series (also shown 
in Chart 4) is for all manufacturing, 
but maquiladoras dominate manu-
facturing in Juárez. This series in-
dicates that employment in Juárez 
factories turned flat this year and 
remains in a no-growth pattern.  
The importance of maquilado-
ras to El Paso is indicated by the 
orange line in Chart 4, which shows 
the  Dallas  Fed’s  index  of  coinci-
dent economic activity, a measure 
of the local business cycle.7 El Paso 
provides myriad services to maqui-
ladoras  in  real  estate,  warehous-
ing, transportation, logistics, com-
puter  systems,  management  and 
other services. This is true for all 
Texas border cities and their Mexi-
can neighbors; the general rule of 
thumb is that a 10 percent increase 
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in production in a neighboring Mex-
ican city will increase employment 
in the bordering U.S. city by 1 to 2 
percent. This influence is apparent 
in the pattern of recent changes in 
El  Paso’s  economic  activity.  The 
recent loss of maquiladora momen-
tum means that El Paso has been 
unable  to  count  on  another  key 
source  of  economic  stimulus  dur-
ing  2007.  
Mexico is important to El Paso 
well beyond the maquiladoras, al-
though these manufacturing plants 
probably  stand  at  the  top  of  the 
list.  General  economic  stability  is 
important in bringing the Mexican 
shopper  to  El  Paso.  Throughout 
the  decades,  about  14  percent  of 
El Paso’s retail sales have been to 
Mexican  shoppers,  most  crossing 
bridges  from  Juárez.  Economic 
stability  provides  confidence  to 
the Mexican consumer and is fun-
damental  to  maintaining  a  strong 
peso.  Mexico’s  currency  has  held 
steady  between  10  and  11  pesos 
per  dollar  since  2003,  with  little 
change in 2007.
Mexico’s  economic  perfor-
mance has been—and is expected 
to remain—much better than might 
be  anticipated  given  a  sweeping 
U.S. economic slowdown. The influ-
ence of U.S. industrial production 
extends beyond the maquiladoras, 
and it’s fair to say that the U.S. has 
been the major driver of the Mexi-
can economy in recent years. This 
is because over 90 percent of Mexi-
can exports go to the U.S., and over 
80 percent of those exports are in-
dustrial products.
However, Mexico has enjoyed 
solid GDP growth near 3 percent 
in 2007, and expectations are that 
this growth will continue and pick 
up slightly in 2008 (Table 3). This 
separation  from  the  recent  slow-
down in the U.S. economy is based 
on  the  continued  growth  of  the 
domestic  Mexican  economy  and 
strong consumption, driven in part 
by  oil  revenues.  It  is  also  based 
on strong exports to Europe that 
filled in any shrinkage in the U.S. 
export market (Chart 5). Just as 
U.S. exports have soared because 
of a strong dollar against the euro, 
Mexican exports have followed the 
same strong path based on a peso/
euro exchange rate that is highly 
favorable to European buyers.  
Fort Bliss
In 2005, the Base Realignment 
and  Closure  (BRAC)  Commission 
put a number of West Texas and 
southern New Mexico military fa-
cilities  up  for  review:  Fort  Bliss 
in  El  Paso,  White  Sands  Missile 
Range near Las Cruces, Holloman 
Air Force Base in Alamogordo and 
Cannon Air Force Base in Clovis. 
Perhaps in testament to the mili-
tary’s need for open land and clear 
skies for maneuvers, all but one of 
these regional facilities will remain 
staffed at pre-BRAC levels. 
The only one that won’t stay 
at  pre-BRAC  levels  is  Fort  Bliss, 
which  emerged  as  a  significant 
winner in terms of size and employ-
ment. The initial plan was to add 
11,500 troops and civilian employ-
ees to the 8,500 already assigned 
to the base, bringing total employ-
ment to 20,000. This would result 
from moving the 1st Armored Divi-
sion from Germany to El Paso, with 
these gains partly offset by the loss 
of the Army’s Air Defense Artillery 
School to Oklahoma.  
Subsequent  announcements 
have  added  a  combat  brigade  to 
Fort Bliss, as well as artillery, avia-
tion and other support units for the 
1st Armored. These units will take 
the  initial  plan  raising  Fort  Bliss 
employment by 11,500 to one that 
adds  20,000  troops  and  civilians. 
This would triple the size of Fort 
Bliss to 30,000 by 2012. The Army 
is  planning  a  $2.6  billion  expan-
sion on the base for living facilities, 
headquarters  and  administrative 
space, dining facilities, aircraft han-
gars,  barracks  and  various  range 
improvements. In addition, the city 
and state are planning and financ-
ing extensive road upgrades to im-
prove base access. Local school dis-
tricts must provide for the 27,000 
family  members  who  will  accom-
pany the relocating troops.  
In 2006, Fort Bliss saw an ad-
dition of nearly 4,000 troops. The 
Chart 4
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Banamex  3.4  3.8
Bancomer  3.2  3.9
Banco de México*  3.0  3.4
International 
  Monetary Fund  2.9  3.0
*Private domestic and international economic  
analysts surveyed by Banco de México.
SOURCES: Banamex, Bancomer, Banco de  
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bulk of these troops were the result 
of a newly formed combat brigade 
under the 1st Cavalry. The net ad-
dition of military and civilian jobs 
in 2007 was fewer than 1,000, and 
much  of  this  stimulus  was  likely 
offset by the deployment of thou-
sands  of  troops  to  Iraq.  Original 
plans to have much of the expan-
sion complete by 2010 have been 
delayed  to  2012,  and  the  biggest 
years for base expansion—perhaps 
accounting for 14,000 of the 20,000 
increase—will not come until 2010 
and 2011. 
The  promise  of  a  significant 
economic  expansion  and  even  an 
economic  boom  driven  by  Fort 
Bliss  remains  firmly  in  place.  If 
we assume that the expansion will 
add roughly 40,000 new jobs over 
the long term, both directly at Fort 
Bliss  and  indirectly  through  eco-
nomic multipliers in the communi-
ty, this single event adds the same 
number of jobs as were added from 
all sources in El Paso during 1997–
2005.8 The arrival of new military 
and civilian jobs in El Paso may be 
slower than originally anticipated, 
but the wave of infrastructure ex-
pansion on the base, on the roads 
and in the school districts is just 
beginning. It will provide substan-
tial stimulus for El Paso’s construc-
tion  sector  over  the  next  several 
years. 
Also, the expansion carries the 
promise  of  new  technology  jobs 
for  the  city  because  the  Evalua-
tion  Brigade  Combat  Team  will 
be formed at Fort Bliss. This unit 
will be the test ground for future 
combat  technologies  using  robot-
ics and information systems, and it 
should attract an array of military 
contractors and consultants eager 
to be near this activity during the 
test  and  evaluation  process.  The 
city hopes to capitalize on this new 
nucleus of technology development 
and testing to form a growing clus-
ter of associated knowledge-based 
businesses.
Looking Forward
Expectations are high for eco-
nomic stimulus from the Fort Bliss 
expansion, but this stimulus arrived 
too late to avoid a significant eco-
nomic slowdown in 2007. Sluggish 
growth in the U.S. industrial sector, 
a housing downturn that spread to 
El Paso and a flat year for the ma-
quiladora industry all conspired to 
pull El Paso’s job growth down to 
less than 1 percent through Octo-
ber. 
Improvement  should  be  slow 
but  steady  into  2008.  The  U.S. 
economy  is  not  expected  to  lend 
a lot of help in 2008. The consen-
sus for the year centers on below-
potential 2.5 percent GDP growth 
and  an  industrial  sector  that  will 
perform  well  below  the  long-run 
average. But infrastructure expan-
sion  at  Fort  Bliss  and  the  arrival 
of another 2,500 jobs on the base 
should provide enough momentum 
for a better 2008 locally. The year 
will remain something of a tug-of-
war between slow national growth 
and Fort Bliss spending.  
                 —Jesus Cañas
                 Robert W. Gilmer 
                 Charles James 
Cañas is an assistant economist and 
James is a research assistant at the 
El  Paso  Branch  of  the  Federal  Re-
serve Bank of Dallas. Gilmer is a vice 
president  and  senior  economist  at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 The payroll job growth cited here does not 
include military employment but only ci-
vilian government jobs. See the discussion 
later in the article on military employment 
at Fort Bliss. 
2 Over the previous 10 years, El Paso’s pay-
roll  employment  has  averaged  only  0.9 
percent growth annually, compared with 
1.1 percent for the U.S. and 1.9 percent 
for Texas. 
3 The definition of median income used in 
these calculations is taken from the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment. The methodology changed in 2005, 
making comparisons before and after 2005 
not strictly comparable. For the sweeping 
changes we are trying to illustrate here, 
it is unlikely that the methodology differ-
ence would alter the picture in a meaning-
ful way. 
4 These figures were compiled directly from 
Home  Mortgage  Disclosure  Act  data  for 
calendar year 2006, which provide high-
interest  rate  lending  by  metropolitan 
area. These are for origination of conven-
tional mortgages (excluding government-
guaranteed loans) on one- to four-family 
homes. Refinanced and mobile homes are 
excluded. See www.ffiec.gov. 
5 For  details  on  the  maquiladora’s  recent 
history, see “Maquiladora Recovery: Les-
sons  for  the  Future,”  by  Jesus  Cañas, 
Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest 
Economy, March/April 2007. 
6 See “Mexican Reform Clouds View of Key 
Industry,” by Jesus Cañas and Robert W. 
Gilmer,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas 
Southwest Economy, May/June 2007. 
7  This measure averaged a 1.3 percent an-
nual increase over the last 10 years in El 
Paso, and it has grown at a 1.9 percent an-
nual rate for the first 10 months of 2007. It 
is a weighted average of changes in local 
payroll  employment,  the  unemployment 
rate, real income and real retail sales.  
8 Based  on  total  employment  calculations 
(including  military)  from  the  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis,  Regional  Economic 
Information System. 
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